“L3C” Spells “Caveat Emptor”
From the Stanford Social Innovative Review. Read the full article here.
Here’s something strange: a concept thrown around routinely and casually in conversations among nonprofits and philanthropies is simultaneously the subject of fierce debate and sometime disapproval by the Internal Revenue Service, a committee of the American Bar Association, and other experts. What is going on?
From the Stanford Social Innovative Review. Read the full article here.
Here’s something strange: a concept thrown around routinely and casually in conversations among nonprofits and philanthropies is simultaneously the subject of fierce debate and sometime disapproval by the Internal Revenue Service, a committee of the American Bar Association, and other experts. What is going on?
The notion of Low Profit Limited Liability Corporations (L3Cs, for short) is that they’re a vehicle for doing well by doing good and therefore an improvement over the typical nonprofit structure. L3Cs are permitted to earn profits, but proponents claim that their praiseworthy intentions—to end hunger or provide clean water or whatever—make those who lend to them eligible for the special tax benefits attached to program-related investments. In other words, this is a legal structure presented as a technique for gaining access to capital (always a struggle for nonprofits) by providing a tax benefit to lenders.
Of course, foundations already get a tax benefit for program-related investments in regular nonprofits, so what, exactly, is the appeal? In theory, foundations might be more interested in program-related investments that generate a reliable flow of capital (in the form of profit) than in program-related investments that generate nothing but additional nonprofit programs and services. Likewise in theory, regular venture capitalists outside of foundations will be more interested in making investments in profit-making entities than in pure nonprofits. This—the notion goes—will increase the amount of capital available to support general good-guy behavior.
Of course, foundations already get a tax benefit for program-related investments in regular nonprofits, so what, exactly, is the appeal? In theory, foundations might be more interested in program-related investments that generate a reliable flow of capital (in the form of profit) than in program-related investments that generate nothing but additional nonprofit programs and services. Likewise in theory, regular venture capitalists outside of foundations will be more interested in making investments in profit-making entities than in pure nonprofits. This—the notion goes—will increase the amount of capital available to support general good-guy behavior.
Read the full article here.
